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The right to marry is guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in art.12,
which reads: "Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family,
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right". This provision was given effect in
the UK through the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporated ECHR rights,
allowing domestic litigants to rely on them before the British courts. The express referral to "national
laws" in art.12 indicates that States may legitimately impose restrictions on the exercise of this right,
such as bars on marriage between persons who fall within the prohibited degrees of a relationship, a
minimum marriageable age, and the requirement to comply with certain formalities for the valid
celebration of marriages. The Convention institutions maintain, nevertheless, the power to scrutinise
any such restrictions, and ensure that domestic law strikes a fair balance between the prevention of
objectionable marriages and the protection of individual rights against social prejudice. Controversial
issues in this area include same-sex marriage, polygamous, underage and religious marriage within
ethnic minority communities, transsexuals' right to marry according to the newly acquired gender, the
suspension of the exercise of the right in circumstances involving deprivation of liberty, the right to
re-marry, and the right to divorce and re-acquire the capacity to marry.
Overview of Topic
1. Whilst the deferential language of art.12 provides for regulation of marriage by national
laws, the Convention institutions have clarified that the conditions for the exercise of this
right do not lie entirely within the discretion of State authorities. As the European Court of
Human Rights ("the Court") observed in R. and F. v. United Kingdom (App. No. 35748/05,
decision of 28 November 2006), "(t)he matter of conditions for marriage in national law
cannot, however, be left entirely to Contracting States as being within their margin of
appreciation. This would be tantamount to finding that the range of options open to a
Contracting State included an effective bar on any exercise of the right to marry. … Any
limitations introduced must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such an extent
that the very essence of the right is impaired".
2. The Court provided a useful summary of restrictions deemed compatible with art.12 in
Jaremowicz v. Poland (App. No. 24023/03, judgment of 5 January 2010) : "The Convention
institutions have accepted that limitations on the right to marry laid down in the national laws
may comprise formal rules concerning such matters as publicity and the solemnisation of
marriage. They may also include substantive provisions based on generally recognised
considerations of public interest, in particular concerning capacity, consent, prohibited
degrees of affinity or the prevention of bigamy. In the context of immigration laws and for
justified reasons, the States may be entitled to prevent marriages of convenience, entered
solely for the purpose of securing an immigration advantage" (para.49).
3. In X. v. Federal Republic of Germany (App. No. 6167/73, decision of 18 December 1974),
the European Commission on Human Rights ("the Commission") found that States were not
bound to recognise legal effects to marriages entered into only in accordance to a religious
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rite , without satisfying the civil procedures prescribed by law. The Grand Chamber
reaffirmed this position in Serife Yigit v. Turkey (App. No. 3976/05, judgment of 2 November
2010), concluding that a woman having undergone a purely religious marriage did not
qualify for the transfer of her late partner's social-security entitlements, in fact art.8 could not
be interpreted as requiring States to establish a particular regime for certain unmarried
couples. It further dismissed the claim that the scheme discriminated on grounds of status in
breach of art.14 (non-discrimination) read in conjunction with art.1 of Protocol 1 (right to
property); the Court found that the difference in treatment based on the non-civil nature of
the marriage pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public order and the rights of others
and it was proportionate, insofar as the conditions for succession to social-security
entitlements were clear and contracting a civil marriage to qualify was not an excessive
burden.
4. Despite the absence of a positive obligation to recognise religious marriages,
inconsistencies in the policy regarding their legal effects can amount to a breach of the
Convention. According to Muñoz Díaz v. Spain (App. No. 49151/07, judgment of 8
December 2009), the failure to attribute legal significance to a Gipsy marriage for the
purposes of survivor's pensions allocation breached art.14 taken in conjunction with art.1 of
Protocol 1, insofar as it was at odds with the earlier treatment of the applicant as a spouse
for other social security purposes; this, for the Court, had generated a legitimate expectation
to the recognition of the validity of the marriage.
5. A number of cases have challenged domestic provisions on the minimum age required to
contract a valid marriage . In Janis Khan v. United Kingdom (App. No. 11579/85, decision of
7 July 1986), the applicant complained that legislation treating as void a marriage
contracted by a girl under the age of 16 prevented him from manifesting his religion through
his Islamic marriage. The Commission held that the imposition of a minimum matrimonial
age is compatible with art.12 even where the individual's religion allows for marriage at a
lower age, in fact marriage could not be considered simply as a form of expression of
thought, conscience or religion. The Commission also found that art.12 allowed States to
establish a different regime for the marriage of persons who have not reached legal
majority, such as the requirement in the UK of parental consent for parties aged between 16
and 18.
6. The Court addressed the legitimacy of the consanguinity bar in Stübing v. Germany (App.
No. 43547/08, judgment of 12 April 2012), a case regarding the criminalisation of incest
between siblings. Following an examination of European laws, the Court noted that "all the
legal systems, including those which do not impose criminal liability, prohibit siblings from
getting married. Thus, a broad consensus transpires that sexual relationships between
siblings are neither accepted by the legal order nor by society as a whole" (para.61). The
Court also noted the German Federal Constitutional Court's justification for criminal liability
based on the protection of the family, sexual self-determination and public health, and the
consideration that "sexual relations between siblings might seriously damage family
structures and consequently society as a whole" (para.63).
7. The compatibility of affinity-based prohibitions with ECHR obligations was considered in B.
and L. v. United Kingdom (App. No. 36536/02, judgment of 13 September 2005). According
to the British government, the bar on the marriage between former father-in-law and
daughter-in-law sought to protect the emotional development of children involved in
confusing family arrangements as well as to safeguard the stability of the family, by
excluding sexual rivalry between fathers and sons. While these objectives were found to be
legitimate, the impugned prohibition failed the compatibility test on the basis that it was not
suitable to achieve the aims pursued: "the bar on marriage does not prevent the
relationships occurring. … There are no incest, or other criminal law, provisions to prevent
extra-marital relationships between parents-in-law and children-in-law being established
notwithstanding that children may live in these homes. It cannot therefore be said that in the
present case the ban on the applicants' marriage prevents any alleged confusion or
emotional insecurity to the second applicant's son" (para.38). The bar on in-law marriages
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was consequently repealed by the Marriage Act 1949 (Remedial) Order 2007/438.
8. In Sanders v. France (App. No. 31401/96, decision of 16 October 1996), the Commission
found that rules designed to preclude marriages of convenience between citizens and
aliens, such as a requirement for the alien to obtain a certificate of capacity to marry, did not
breach art.12, and postponing the marriage until the application was processed did not
impair the substance of the right. In O'Donoghue v. United Kingdom (App. No. 34848/07,
judgment of 14 December 2010), however, the Court condemned a policy whereby aliens
with no leave or short-term leave to remain were automatically denied the certificate
enabling them to marry. For the Court, even if such persons were more likely to enter into
sham marriages, "a blanket prohibition, without any attempt being made to investigate the
genuineness of the proposed marriages, restricted the right to marry to such an extent that
the very essence of the right was impaired" (para.89). Moreover, the Court found that the
substantial administrative fee could also impair the essence of the right, and the fact that
aliens without leave to remain did not need an authorization if they wished to enter an
Anglican marriage amounted to discrimination on religious grounds.
9. In M. and O.M. v. the Netherlands (App. No.12139/86, decision of 5 October 1987), the
Commission held that "a Contracting State cannot be required under the Convention to give
full recognition to polygamous marriages which are in conflict with their own ordre public"
(para.2). In E.A. and A.A. v. the Netherlands (App. No. 14501/89, decision of 6 January
1992) it found that legislation requiring aliens to choose only one spouse and her children
for the purposes of family reunification, while distinguishing on the ground of birth, was
objectively and reasonably justified. As regards the impact on migrant children present in
the territory, R.B. v. United Kingdom (App. No. 19628/92, decision of 29 June 1992)
accepted that the refusal to issue a residence permit to a second wife aimed at the
"preservation of the Christian based monogamous culture dominant in that country"
(para.1), subsumed under the "protection of morals or the rights and freedom of others" in
art.8(2). The Commission emphasised the clash between the permission sought with a
fundamental principle of the UK as well as the parents' voluntary choices, in full awareness
of the difficulties they would face in the host country.
10. Initially reluctant to uphold claims by transsexuals prevented from marrying according to the
acquired gender , the Court held in Rees v. United Kingdom (App. No. 9532/81, judgment of
17 October 1986) that art.12 "refers to the traditional marriage between persons of opposite
biological sex" (para.49), although it conceded that "the appropriate legal measures
concerning transsexuals should be kept under review having regard particularly to scientific
and societal developments" (para.47). In Cossey v. United Kingdom (App. No. 10843/84,
judgment of 29 August 1990), it found that "it remains the case … that gender reassignment
surgery does not result in the acquisition of all the biological characteristics of the other sex"
(para.40) and, given the persisting lack of European consensus, "attachment to the
traditional concept of marriage provides sufficient reason for the continued adoption of
biological criteria for determining a person's sex for the purposes of marriage" (para.46). In
Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom (App. No. 22885/93, 23390/94, judgment of 30
July 1998), while reaffirming Rees and Cossey, the Court lamented that the UK had not
revisited the legal attribution of sex so as to adapt it to the increased social acceptance of
transsexualism.
11. The Grand Chamber modified this approach in Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom (App.
No. 28957/95, judgment of 11 July 2002) and I. v. United Kingdom (App. No. 25680/94,
judgment of 11 July 2002), upholding the right to legal recognition of the new sexual
identity. The decision was largely based on the inconsistencies of domestic legislation:
"Where a State has authorised the treatment and surgery alleviating the condition of a
transsexual, … it appears illogical to refuse to recognise the legal implications of the result
to which the treatment leads" (para.78). While the Court struggles to justify the departure
from previous case law on the basis of widespread consensus in Europe, it "attaches less
importance to the lack of evidence of a common European approach …, than to the clear
and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of increased
Page 3
social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of
post-operative transsexuals" (para.85). The Gender Recognition Act 2004 removed the
incompatibility found in Goodwin and I. by allowing the recognition of the new gender
identity for legal purposes, including marriage.
12. To date, same-sex marriage has not been recognised as a right protected under art.12. In
Parry v. UK (App. No. 42971/05, decision of 28 November 2006), the Court rejected the
complaint of a male-to-female transsexual who was barred from obtaining full gender
recognition as long as he remained married; recognition would have, in fact, resulted in the
validation of a same-sex marriage contrary to s.11(c) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (now
repealed), which provided that a marriage was void unless the parties were "respectively
male and female". The Court reiterated that art.12 "enshrine[d] the traditional concept of
marriage as being between a man and a woman", and held that the interference was
proportionate, insofar as continued ratification of the legal bonds between the applicant and
his wife was available in the form of a civil partnership, an institution carrying legal effects
analogous to marriage. The Grand Chamber has recently confirmed in Hämäläinen v.
Finland (App. No. 37359/09, judgment of 16 July 2014) that it was not disproportionate to
require the conversion of a marriage into a registered partnership as a precondition for the
full recognition of an acquired gender, as the latter institution offered equivalent legal
protection.
13. In Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (App. No. 30141/04, judgment of 24 June 2010), the
applicants alleged that the refusal to either allow same-sex couples to marry or introduce
alternative legal recognition was discriminatory. The Court reiterated that, under Article 12,
the decision to allow same-sex marriage was left to States, given the reference to "men and
women", uncommon to other ECHR articles; furthermore, since the specific provision on
marriage did not confer a right to same-sex marriage, it could not be based on the more
general right to respect for family life in art.8. The Court remained ambiguous as regards
the alleged obligation to introduce an alternative legal institution for same-sex couples
ineligible to marry, and held that, since Austria had introduced registered partnerships after
the institution of the complaint, it could not be reproached for not having done so earlier.
Subsequently, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece (Apps. Nos. 29381/09, 32684/09, judgment
of 7 November 2013) clarified that, whilst States are not required to provide an official form
of partnership for same-sex couples, legislation introducing civil unions and restricting
access thereto to different-sex couples breached Article 8 taken in conjunction with art.14.
14. By enacting the Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act 2013, the UK went beyond the ECHR
requirements; moreover, since civil partnerships were not available to heterosexual couples,
the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was not mandated by UK's participation to the ECHR either.
Nor was same-sex marriage a requirement under art.9 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, which stipulates: "The right to marry and the right to found a
family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of
these rights"; the omission of the reference to "men and women" does not impose the
recognition of same-sex marriage, but merely permits the coexistence of different
approaches.
15. As the Commission stated in Hamer v. United Kingdom (App. No. 7114/75, report of 13
October 1979), persons deprived of liberty do not forfeit the right to marry and "any
restriction or regulation of the exercise of that right must not be such as to injure its
substance" (para.63). Even where the hindrance is temporary, as in the case of prisoners
serving a determinate custodial sentence, positive action is required of States to permit the
effective exercise of the right in prison or on temporary release under escort, for which "no
specially onerous or complex arrangements are necessary" (para.67). The objection that
the prisoner could not cohabit or consummate his marriage during the course of the
sentence was rejected on the basis that "[t]he essence of the right to marry… is the
formation of a legally binding association between a man and a woman" (para.71). The
same reasoning was applied in Sidney Draper v. United Kingdom (App. No. 8186/78, report
of 10 July 1980) to detainees serving a life sentence; the Commission concluded that the
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lack of facilities to marry was equivalent to a denial of the right for the foreseeable future
and injured its very substance.
16. In Jaremowicz v. Poland (App. No. 24023/03, judgment of 5 January 2010) the Court held
that, while the requirement for a detainee to obtain prior leave in order to contract marriage
was not inconsistent with art.12, the authorities could not exercise discretion arbitrarily:
"Except for overriding security considerations and in order to ensure that the right to marry
is exercised "in accordance with the national laws" … the authorities are not allowed under
art.12 to interfere with a prisoner's decision to establish a marital relationship with a person
of his choice, especially on the grounds that the relationship is not acceptable to them or
deviates from prevailing social conventions and norms" (para.59). The Court was critical of
the objection that the prospective spouse was a female detainee illegally met in prison and
with whom very superficial contact had taken place: "[The Court] does not see any reason
why [the authorities] should … evaluate the depth of the applicant's feelings, debate on the
quality of his relationship and make remarks implicitly or explicitly criticising his decision to
marry a particular person, based solely on the circumstances in which he found and chose
his intended wife" (para.58).
17. In Frasik v. Poland (App. No. 22933/02, judgment of 5 January 2010), the Court further
emphasised that Article 12 does not warrant an inquiry into the parties' reasons for
marrying, in particular the suspicion that they wished for the intending wife to become a
non-compellable witness in the case against the applicant: "Nor is there any place under the
Convention system, where tolerance and broadmindedness are the acknowledged
hallmarks of democratic society, for any automatic interference with prisoners' rights,
including their right to establish a marital relationship with the person of their choice, based
purely on such arguments as what … might be acceptable to or what might offend public
opinion" (para.93).
18. The argument that art.12 encompasses a right to divorce was rejected in Johnston v.
Ireland (App. No. 9697/82, judgment of 18 December 1986). For the Court, the ordinary
meaning of the words "right to marry" indicated that "they cover the formation of marital
relationships but not their dissolution", and "the travaux préparatoires disclose no intention
to include … any guarantee of a right to have the ties of marriage dissolved by divorce"
(paras 52-53). Even if the non-availability of divorce was analysed as a restriction on the
right to marry, "in a society adhering to the principle of monogamy, such a restriction [could
not] be regarded as injuring the substance of the right" (para.52). Judge De Meyer's
separate opinion suggested, nevertheless, that "a balance must be achieved which ensures
the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position. …
the complete exclusion of any possibility of seeking the civil dissolution of a marriage is not
compatible with the right to respect for private and family life, with the right to freedom of
conscience and religion and with the right to marry and to found a family" (para.6).
19. Conversely, according to F. v. Switzerland (App. No. 11329/85, judgment of 18 December
1987), "if national legislation allows divorce, it secures for divorced persons the right to
remarry without unreasonable restrictions" (para.38). A three-year temporary interdiction to
remarry after three failed marriages was therefore disproportionate to the aim of ensuring
the stability of marriage and impaired the very substance of the right. The Court took into
consideration the negative impact of the prohibition on the new partner and any children
born to the de facto union. The Court was unimpressed by the paternalistic concerns of the
respondent government as regards the protection of the prospective new spouse and the
divorcee himself, dismissing the argument as "not of sufficient weight to justify the
impugned interference in the case of a person of full age in possession of his mental
faculties" (para.37).
20. The capacity to enter marriage may also be indirectly affected by the excessive length of
divorce proceedings . In Aresti Charalambous v. Cyprus (App. No. 43151/04, judgment of
19 July 2007), the Court accepted that "a failure of the domestic authorities to conduct
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divorce proceedings within a reasonable time could, in certain circumstances, raise an issue
under Article 12" (para.56). In V.K. v. Croatia (App. No. 38380/08, judgment of 27
November 2012), the Court found that remarriage had been unduly delayed by the length of
divorce proceedings (over five years), in fact "the applicant was left in a state of prolonged
uncertainty which amounted to an unreasonable restriction of his right to marry" (para.106).
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